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People not only obtain utility from actual outcomes but also from the conditions
which lead to these outcomes. The paper proposes an economic concept of this
notion of procedural utility. Preferences beyond outcome can be manifold. We distin-
guish procedural utility people get from institutions as such, i.e., from how allocative
and redistributive decisions are taken, procedural utility from activities towards which
people have an intrinsic attitude and procedural utility from the way being treated in
interaction with other people. In an empirical application, it is studied whether people
gain procedural utility from participating in the political decision-making process
itself, irrespective of the outcome. Utility is measured by individuals’ reported sub-
jective well-being. We find that participation rights provide procedural utility in terms
of a feeling of self-determination and influence. In contrast, actual participation and
use of participation rights does not.
JEL classifications: D60, D63, D72, H73, I31
I. Introduction
People are likely to obtain utility not only from actual outcomes but also from the
conditions leading to these outcomes. This procedural utility is a quite different
source of an individual’s well-being than the output included in a traditional utility
function. Individuals may, for instance, have preferences for participation and
autonomy in decision-making at the workplace, in the market as well as in politics.
These are preferences going beyond the expected outcome. When people act within
institutions, they may experience a higher subjective well-being when they are
treated in a way they consider to be just and fair. Procedural utility resulting
from activities is obviously important in the labor market. As Scitovsky (1976)
argued in his Joyless Economy, intrinsic work enjoyment is a major source of utility.
Scitovsky even proposed that ‘. . . the difference between liking and disliking one’s
work may well be more important than the differences in economic satisfaction
that the disparities in our income lead to’ (p.103). Thus, utility is reaped from the
process itself, over and above the outcome generated.1
The possibility of process utility has been largely neglected in economics.2 In the
standard work tool of economists, game theory, payoffs are usually expressed as
von Neumann-Morgenstern utilities, which solely refer to outcomes. Moreover, the
ordinal revolution in economics has abandoned any hedonic content of utility.
However, a better understanding of utility has to go beyond the decision utility
considered in traditional utility theory.
This paper intends to contribute to the empirical analysis of outcome and
process utility. It addresses the two major questions in the analysis of procedural
utility: (i) How can utility be measured? and (ii) how can outcome and process
utility be disentangled? We propose reported subjective well-being as a suitable
proxy measure of utility. Measures of reported satisfaction with life and happiness
have for decades been extensively studied in psychology and have contributed
greatly to the understanding of individual well-being (see e.g., Diener et al.,
1999, and Kahneman et al., 1999). In recent years, measures of subjective well-
being have been successfully applied in economic research (for surveys see
Oswald, 1997; Frey and Stutzer 2002a,b). In our application, it is shown that
the two types of utility can be measured in a particular, but important, context,
namely participatory decision-making. We study participation in democratic
decision-making, and its effect on utility in the form of satisfaction with life.
In order to address the second question, i.e., to distinguish between the two
types of utility which result from participation in democratic decision-making,
and to measure their relative size, we investigate differences between nationals
and foreigners. National citizens are allowed to participate politically, and there-
fore may enjoy satisfaction from both outcome and process, while foreigners
have no political participation rights and therefore do not enjoy procedural utility
from this source.
Section 2 of this paper provides a short theoretical discussion of the concept
of procedural utility and introduces reported subjective well-being as a proxy
measure for utility in economics. Section 3 outlines the empirical application of
the framework for the study of procedural utility from participation in democratic
decision-making. Section 4 presents the empirical analyses and addresses the con-
trast between actual participation and participation rights. The last section offers
conclusions.
beyond outcomes: measuring procedural utility 91
..........................................................................................................................................................................
1 Direct benefits generating procedural utility are thus non-instrumental in nature.
2 Simon (1976, 1978) and Sen (1995) argued generally that economic choice models should combine
preferences for outcome as well as for processes. But such amalgamation is not easy to undertake.
Harsanyi (1993, p.314) states that procedural utility is incompatible with expected utility theory, and
Rabin (1993, p.1285), in game theory, believes that procedural utility certainly cannot be analyzed by
appropriately transforming the payoffs of a conventional game.
2. Procedural utility and economic theory
2.1 An economic concept of procedural utility
The focus on tangible outcomes in the aftermath of the positivistic movement in
economics contributed a lot to the success of the economic approach to behavior in
the social sciences. However, outcomes are not the only source of utility and not
the only driving force behind behavior. There is something beyond instrumental
outputs as they are captured in a traditional utility function. People can have
preferences about how outcomes are generated. These preferences about proce-
dures generate procedural or process utility (for a general discussion see Frey
et al., 2004).
The sources of procedural utility are manifold. We propose to classify them into
three broad categories.
First, there is the procedural utility people get from institutions as such.
People have preferences about how allocative and redistributive decisions are
taken. They may, for example, appreciate the market place for the freedom
it provides in individual choice and democracy for the equality it provides in
political decision-making. Thus, people get utility from living and acting under
particular institutions over and above outcomes.3
Second, there is the procedural utility people get from (non-interactive) individ-
ual behavior, when they have an intrinsic attitude towards the action or choice
process they are involved in. A theoretical literature reflects economists’ interest in
this kind of procedural utility. In particular, it has been useful to model a specific
utility for gambling (see Le Menestrel, 2001). Pascal (1670) was well aware of the
fact that people derive utility from the mere act of engaging in an activity such as
gambling, and so were Marschak (1950), von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944),
and Harsanyi (1993).4
Third, it may be argued that procedural utility is involved in the inter-
action between people. On the one hand, people can get satisfaction from acting
in a fair way or by being honest with other people, quite independent of
the outcome. On the other hand, people evaluate actions towards them not
only by their consequences but also by the intentions behind these actions.5 An
individual is, for example, emotionally affected in a negative way by an action
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3 A related literature in health economics debates about process values when assessing equality in
health policies. For example, Sen (2002) argues that inequalities in health care matter beyond inequalities
in health achievement. Women are therefore not to be discriminated in health care although they
have ex ante higher life expectancy due to their biological preconditions. For the relevance of process
aspects in epidemiological research see, e.g., Marmot and Wilkinson (1999).
4 There are two strands of literature in empirical economic research that deal with an object very much
related to procedural utility of this second type: the first is compensation differentials in wage rates
reflecting the nonmonetary benefits of work (e.g., Rosen, 1986, Viscusi, 1993), and the second is process
benefits in studies on the use of time (e.g., Juster and Stafford, 1985).
5 Economic models of behavior that include the underlying motivation of people are for example Falk
and Fischbacher (2000) and Rabin (1993).
when he or she attributes the actor with a criminal motive rather than a neutral
motive.6
Procedures as a source of individual utility cannot easily be integrated in tradi-
tional economic theory, even though they are themselves reflected in behavior. This
is because the traditional framework excludes non-instrumental concerns in the
behavior affecting people’s choices. Otherwise, neoclassical economics’ fundamen-
tal axiom of monotonicity would be violated and the standard expected utility
model could not be applied. To give an example of how people’s attitudes towards
a procedure infringe the very fundaments of the traditional utility model, consider
an individual’s preference for autonomous decision-making. People may value
taking an autonomous decision rather than delegating it, even though they have
to expect a worse outcome on average in return. In this case, observing related
individual choice behavior and assessing it from a traditional perspective would
necessarily lead to an inconsistent representation of individual preferences.
The concept of procedural utility is related to research on (procedural) fairness
in economics and in other social sciences. In field, experiment and survey studies,
it has been shown that prosocial preferences influence market behavior (e.g.,
Kahneman et al., 1986; Bewley, 1999; Fehr and Schmidt, 2003). People are for
instance willing to bear the costs of taking revenge if they perceive themselves to
be treated in an unfair manner. Prosocial preferences can thus facilitate trade and
profit maximization, in particular if they help to overcome social dilemmas. In
these cases ‘fairness payoffs’ (Rabin, 1993, p.1294) are to be added to the material
payoffs. Perceived fairness can depend strongly on the applied procedures for
decision-making.7 Procedures are of particular concern when allocation conflicts
cannot exclusively be resolved based on outcomes as well as when there is pervasive
uncertainty about the outcomes themselves (e.g., Anand, 2001).
In previous research, concerns for procedural fairness or justice have been seen
as almost exclusively instrumental, i.e., people have preferences for fair procedures
because they expect desirable outcomes (Thibaut and Walker, 1975). However,
there are also theories of procedural fairness in which an intrinsic value is attrib-
uted to the process itself, in particular when fairness perceptions are closely linked
with notions of agency (e.g., Lane, 1988; Lind and Tyler, 1988). Procedures are then
evaluated by the relational information that they convey, such as assessments of
impartiality, trustworthiness of superiors and authorities, and the extent to which
individuals feel they are treated with dignity (e.g., Tyler et al., 1997). This evalua-
tion also has behavioral consequences: In a study about recidivism in cases of
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6 Rabin (2002) emphasizes the need for an extended utility concept if these aspects of individual inter-
action beyond narrow outcome oriented self-interest are to be integrated in welfare analysis: ‘. . . players
in games behave systematically differently as a function of previous behavior by other players. This shows
that people care not only about outcomes, but also how they arrived at those outcomes. The fact that
preferences cannot be defined solely on outcomes can be reconciled with preference theory, but requires
an expansion of the notion of what enters the utility function’ (p.15).
7 For an experimental application see Bolton et al. (2000).
domestic violence, Lind and Tyler (1988) find that recidivism rates are lower when
accused people are respectfully treated by arresting officers.
Related research is not restricted to perceived (procedural) fairness, but many
other intrinsic pleasures of a procedure have been identified, among them the
utility gained by facing and meeting challenges, expressing oneself, using one’s
talents, and reporting experiences over and above any instrumental value they
may have. But procedures may also lower utility, for instance by being cognitively
taxing, or by forcing one into making a decision (e.g., Lane, 1988).8
The idea of procedural utility goes beyond the narrow consequentialism of
standard economics and is thus vulnerable to the accusation of being tautological.
However, traditional economics is often also applied as a tautology, in the sense
that every observed change in behavior is assumed to reflect changes in relative
costs or prices. In order to be a fruitful concept that makes testable predictions,
it is necessary to specify conditions under which procedural utility either affects
behavior or individual well-being. The latter approach is followed here.
2.2 Measuring utility
In this paper, utility is measured in terms of reported subjective well-being. Thus,
a proxy measure for utility is applied in order to directly study the concept of
procedural utility. Indicators of subjective well-being are increasingly studied and
applied in economics as a reliable measure of individual utility (e.g., Clark and
Oswald, 1994; Di Tella et al., 2001; Easterlin, 1974; Freeman, 1978; Frey and
Stutzer, 2000, 2002a; Kahneman et al., 1997; and for surveys Frey and Stutzer,
2002b; Layard, 2005). With the help of a single question or several questions on
global self-reports, it is possible to get indications of individuals’ evaluation of their
life satisfaction or happiness. Behind the score indicated by a person lies a cognitive
assessment to what extent their overall quality of life is judged in a favorable way
(Veenhoven, 1993).
Subjective well-being is generally assessed in large-scale surveys. In a number
of studies, the validity of these survey measures has been documented. It has, for
example, been shown that different measures of happiness correlate well with one
another (e.g., Fordyce, 1988). Reliability studies have found that reported subjective
well-being is moderately stable and sensitive to changing life circumstances (e.g.,
Ehrhardt et al., 2000; Headey and Wearing, 1991). Consistency tests reveal that
happy people are more often smiling during social interactions (Ferna´ndez-Dols
and Ruiz-Belda, 1995), are rated as happy by friends and family members (Sandvik
et al., 1993), as well as by spouses (Costa and McCrae, 1988), are less likely to
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8 A psychological underpinning of procedural utility is provided by several theories in psychology. In
self-determination theory, participation and autonomy in decision-making provide procedural goods
that serve innate needs of competence, autonomy and relatedness and thus contribute to individual well-
being (Deci and Ryan, 2000). In the group-value model of Lind and Tyler (1988), procedural justice is
seen to build group solidarity and to strengthen its members’ good standing in a group. Procedural
utility is thus provided by fulfilling individuals’ long-term affiliated needs.
commit suicide (Koivumaa et al., 2001) and that changes in brain electrical activity
and heart rate account for substantial variance in reported negative affect (Davidson
et al., 2000). The existing state of research suggests that, for many reasons, reported
subjective well-being is a satisfactory empirical approximation to individual utility.
It is thus possible to study procedural effects on individual well-being directly.
3. Application: procedural utility from participation
A large literature in the social sciences, especially in psychology, political science,
and sociology, attributes a positive value to participation, as it enhances individuals’
perception of self-determination (for an extensive survey see Lane, 2000, ch.13).
Participation is thereby considered as an activity, as well as a characteristic of an
institution. People can have preferences about both of these procedural aspects of
participation, which go beyond the outcome of a participatory decision-making
mechanism. In the following analysis, we focus on procedural utility from partici-
pation as a characteristic of a state of being, i.e., living and acting under democratic
institutions that grant participation rights. In the robustness analysis, we also take
procedural utility from the activity, i.e., actual participation, into consideration.
The right to participate in political decisions is a crucial characteristic of any
democratic institution. People can gain procedural utility from this state of being as
they may have preferences about the democratic institutions within which they live,
and act beyond the outcome that is generated by democratic decision-making.
They may feel that the political sphere takes their wishes seriously into account
in a fair political process, or they may feel alienation and apathy towards the
political institutions installed. Moreover, they may have a firm or weak belief
that the democratic process is responsive to them, independent of the goods and
services they are provided with by the state.9 Participation rights in the political
mechanism of decision-making, ranging from voting in elections, launching and
voting on referenda, to running for a seat in parliament, may thus provide a feeling
of being involved and having political influence, as well as a notion of inclusion,
identity and self-determination. It may even be hypothesized that the right to
participate in political decision-making accords the citizens more encompassing
self-determination than actual participation, because political participation rights
are a comprehensive characteristic of political institutions and affect people’s well-
being, and not only during a restricted period of political activation. With the
rights to participate, the decision is left up to the individual of whether to actually
participate or not. Persons may value the right to participate even if they rarely or
never exercise it themselves.
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9 A different view is proposed in the literature on voice in procedural justice. In the early work of Thibaut
and Walker (1975), it is argued that people want the right to participate so that they can influence the
outcome of a process. This work argues for a purely instrumental model of participation. The preference
for participation is thus restricted to its option value.
In most countries, the status of being a national fundamentally differs from that
of being a foreigner, by providing the right to vote and to participate in political
decision-making in general. In many other ways, the law demands that they are
treated equally. Thus, for example, they have the same human rights and, once
admitted into the country, they have (with few exceptions) the same rights to
participate in economic affairs. It cannot, of course, be denied that the national
legislation and political decisions tend to be in favor of nationals. However, it
follows that, on average, the nationals derive more utility from political participa-
tion rights than foreigners do, provided that nationals enjoy both outcome and
process utility, while the foreigners only enjoy outcome utility.
The distinction between nationals and foreigners is largely exogenous. Whether a
person may become a citizen or not is determined by law, in particular the require-
ment of having stayed in the host country for a sufficient number of years, having
sufficient mastery of the local language and the content of the constitution. Only
after these stringent requirements are met, does an individual have the choice of
becoming a citizen. Of course, whether those persons eligible for citizenship indeed
accept it, also depends inter alia on their expected procedural utility, i.e., their wish
to become a community member with full participation rights. Some will decide
not to change their citizenship. Becoming a citizen is more or less automatic for
young persons and spouses, once the head of the household has decided to do so.
In contrast, resident citizens have no possibility of choosing their status of citizen-
ship. They cannot give up their current citizenship without relocation. The dis-
tribution of residents in a country between the two categories, foreigners and
citizens, thus strongly reflects formal exogenous criteria for citizenship, and not
revealed preferences for procedural goods. As a result of these considerations, one
may assume that the distinction between nationals and foreigners influences the
extent to which one benefits from outcome and process utility, while the reverse
causation can be ignored. We also assume that differences in outcome discrimina-
tion of foreigners at the sub-federal level can be neglected. This is a necessary
restriction in order to identify the existence and relative importance of procedural
utility. It also shows the limits of our strategy.10
On the basis of our discussion, the following empirically testable hypothesis can
be formulated:
The utility derived from the right to participate in the political process
(measured by the extent of direct democratic rights across regions) supports the
subjective well-being of the citizens. The foreigners living in the same region, who
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10 We think that the assumption of non-systematic discrimination of foreigners at the sub-federal level
can be defended. First, in Switzerland, the economic restrictions and rights of foreigners are almost
exclusively dealt with at the national level (like the restricted access to some professions). Second,
previous research for Switzerland does not find evidence for a serious problem of a ‘tyranny of the
majority’. While Gamble (1997) finds some evidence for the suppression of civil rights in local and state
ballots in the United States, there is evidence to the contrary for the USA and Switzerland (Cronin, 1989;
Frey and Goette, 1998).
are excluded from this process, experience lower levels of happiness than the
citizens.
In this hypothesis, the strategy used to identify procedural utility is based on the
formal distinction between citizens and foreigners. The corresponding statistical
approach is in analogy to the differences-in-differences estimator for time series.
In a crude formulation, procedural utility is the additional positive effect of
more extended participation rights for citizens’ well-being compared to that for
foreigners’.
4. Empirical analysis
4.1 Data and descriptive analysis
We study the proposed hypothesis using a survey based on more than 6,000 inter-
views with residents of Switzerland, collected by Leu et al. (1997).11 The proxy
measure for individual utility is based on the answers to the following question:
‘How satisfied are you with your life as a whole these days?’ Simultaneously, the
respondents were shown a table with a 10-point scale, of which only the two
extreme values (‘completely dissatisfied’ and ‘completely satisfied’) were verbalized.
The survey found a high general life satisfaction in Switzerland, with an average of
8.2 out of 10 points. While this is a high score, there are also other Western
countries, in particular in Scandinavia, with similar levels of life satisfaction.
Data for Switzerland is studied because of unique variation in political participa-
tion rights. In Switzerland, in addition to elections, there are several different ways
of engaging directly in the political process at three state levels. Most important
are the direct democratic instruments. They exist at a national level, as well as at
the level of the 26 cantons (states). The cantonal level is considered here, because
participation rights at the national level apply equally across the country. In
cantons, the major direct democratic instruments are the popular initiatives to
change the canton’s constitution or laws, a compulsory and optional referendum
to prevent new laws, or the changing of existing laws, and an optional financial
referendum to prevent new state expenditure. Due to the federal structure of
Switzerland, major areas of competence are held by the cantons and, thus, there
is a high potential influence of direct legislation on the outcome of the political
process in Swiss cantons. However, citizens’ access to these instruments differs
substantially from canton to canton. Thus, for example, the number of signatures
required to launch an initiative or an optional referendum, or the time span within
which the signatures have to be collected, varies. The referendum on public expendi-
tures may be launched at different levels of additional outlays. We constructed an
index designed to reflect the extent of direct democratic participation rights in the
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11 The survey data were collected between 1992 and 1994 in order to investigate the problem of poverty
in Switzerland. The information contained in the data set is based on personal interviews and tax
statistics.
26 cantons (for details of the index construction, see the Appendix). This index is
defined using a six point scale, with one indicating the lowest, and six the highest
degree of participation rights for the citizens.
According to the hypothesis formulated above, more developed participation
rights are expected to increase reported satisfaction with life, due to a larger
increase in procedural utility. In Table 1, the utility difference between residents
living in cantons with weak participation rights (the index is lower than four) and
with strong participation rights is reported.12 On average, residents with strong
participation rights report a 0.22 point higher level of well-being. However, this
difference may also be due to a favorable outcome of the political process. There is
ample evidence that in more direct democratic jurisdictions the outcome of the
political process is closer to the wishes of the residents (see e.g., Frey, 1994; and the
survey by Kirchga¨ssner et al., 1999). In order to differentiate between outcome and
procedural utility, the proposed identification criteria of people’s nationality is
considered.13 As foreigners are excluded from political participation rights, but
not from the outcome of the political process, differences in levels of satisfaction
between citizens and foreigners in cantons with weak and strong participation
rights have to be compared. Where participation rights are weak, a difference in
well-being between Swiss citizens and foreigners of 0.55 points is measured. The
respective difference in cantons with extended direct democratic rights is 0.80
points. Both gaps in subjective well-being are due to differences in individual
characteristics, incomplete assimilation and, above all, the citizens’ opportunity
to reap procedural utility. The differences-in-differences between cantons with
weak and strong participation rights then reflects the gain in procedural utility
of citizens due to more extended participation rights. The raw data show a large
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12 A cut-off point of four is selected in order to split the sample into two sub-samples with an approxi-
mately equal number of individual observations.
13 The percentage of foreigners in the population for Switzerland was 18.5 percent between 1992 and
1994.
Table 1 Satisfaction with life and participation rights, descriptive statistics
Participation rights
.......................................................
Weak Strong Difference
Whole sample 8.099 8.318 0.218**
(0.033) (0.029) (0.044)
Foreigners 7.625 7.602 0.023
(0.090) (0.104) (0.136)
Swiss citizens 8.176 8.402 0.226**
(0.036) (0.029) (0.046)
Difference 0.551** 0.800** 0.249*
(Swiss citizens-foreigners) (0.096) (0.092) (0.133)
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: *0.05 < p< 0.10, **p< 0.05.
Data sources: Leu et al. (1997) and Stutzer (1999).
effect of procedural utility in terms of reported satisfaction with life of 0.25
points.14 A multiple regression analysis has to test whether this result still holds
if individual characteristics are controlled for. An ordered probit estimation and
extended discussion of the result is provided in the next subsection.
4.2 Results of the econometric analysis
The descriptive analysis presented above offers preliminary evidence for positive
procedural utility caused by stronger participation rights. A multiple regression
analysis has to show whether this result is robust. Once again, a differences-in-
differences estimation strategy is applied to identify procedural utility. Technically,
an interaction term is included in the estimation equation that combines the
variable that captures the proposed source of procedural utility with the identifying
criteria. Here, the identifying characteristic is being a foreigner.
Table 2 presents the estimated coefficients and marginal effects of a microecono-
metric happiness function, taking into account participation rights, as well as a
large set of control variables. In order to exploit the ranking information contained
in the originally scaled dependent variable, a weighted ordered probit model is
applied.15 The weighting variable used allows representative results at an individual
level for Switzerland.16 Throughout the remainder of the paper, we use a robust
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14 An alternative differences-in-differences interpretation considers the rows in Table 1 instead of the
columns. Given that foreigners cannot reap procedural utility from the democratic process because they
are formally excluded, the difference in reported life satisfaction between people living in cantons with
weak and with strong participation rights is due to a difference in outcome utility. For the raw data, the
difference in outcome utility is close to zero. In the case of Swiss citizens, the difference includes
procedural as well as outcome utility. The raw effect of stronger participation rights is on average 0.2
points on the satisfaction scale. Considering both foreigners and Swiss citizens, the differences-in-
differences due to procedural utility is 0.2 points.
15 The use of ordered probit or logit to estimate microeconometric happiness functions is based on the
following intuition: Person i experiences in time period t true well-being or utility Wit . W

it is the latent
variable that depends on a set of institutional, socio-demographic and personal characteristics xit and
some independent random errors "it:
Wit ¼ xitþ "it :
People do not report latent well-being W but can only give a discrete value on, e.g., a scale from 1 to
10. Reported well-being Wit takes score k with 1 k< 10 whenever Wit is between two thresholds k-1
and k:
Wit ¼ k()k1 < Wit  k:
Zavoina and McKelvey (1975) developed a procedure (called ordered probit) that chooses estimates for
 (i.e., the relation between observed characteristics and well-being), as well as for the thresholds k so
that the estimated probability of the observed responses is maximised. Mathematically,  is chosen so
that ln(pk) is maximised with the probability p of observing level k: pk¼P(k-1 < xitþ"itk).
16 Due to clustering and stratification, in contrast to pure random sampling, weights are necessary to get
approximately unbiased point estimates. Weights are proportional to the inverse of the probability of
being sampled. In addition, the weights are adjusted to the demographic structure in 1992.
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Table 2 Procedural utility and participation rights.
Dependent variable: satisfaction with life
Weighted ordered probit
Std. err. adjusted to clustering on 26 cantons
......................................................................................................
Coefficient t-value Marginal effect (score 10)
Participation rights (PR) 0.097 3.22 0.033
PR x foreigner (ITPR) 0.067 1.75 0.023
Foreigner 0.042 0.29 0.014
Demographic variables
Age 30–39 0.089 1.00 0.030
Age 40–49 0.013 0.17 0.004
Age 50–59 0.009 0.15 0.003
Age 60–69 0.302 4.24 0.108
Age 70–79 0.378 4.51 0.137
Age 80 and older 0.355 3.07 0.130
Female 0.033 1.02 0.011
Bad health 0.434 7.63 0.132
Middle education 0.077 2.22 0.026
High education 0.039 0.88 0.013
Separated, without partner 0.590 2.30 0.162
Separated with partner 0.664 1.82 0.177
Widowed, without partner 0.204 4.02 0.066
Widowed with partner 0.078 0.51 0.027
Divorced, without partner 0.348 4.14 0.106
Divorced with partner 0.094 0.74 0.031
Single, without partner 0.175 2.55 0.057
Single with partner 0.085 1.37 0.028
Socio-economic variables
Self-employed 0.056 1.06 0.019
Unemployed 0.780 4.56 0.200
Student 0.022 0.24 0.008
Housewife 0.119 2.09 0.042
Retired 0.157 2.58 0.053
Other employment status 0.082 0.60 0.029
Equivalence income
SFr. 2000–3000 0.065 1.86 0.022
SFr. 3000–4000 0.121 2.66 0.042
SFr. 4000–5000 0.259 4.67 0.093
SFr. 5000 and more 0.184 3.54 0.065
Contextual variables
Member in associations 0.167 6.98 0.056
Urbanization 0.057 1.34 0.020
French speaking canton 0.075 0.96 0.025
Italian speaking canton 0.297 4.30 0.108
Observations 6124
Prob > F 0.0002
Notes: Dependent variable: level of satisfaction on a ten point scale. White estimator for variance.
Reference group: ‘Swiss’, ‘people younger than 30’, ‘men’, ‘healthy people’, ‘people with low education’,
‘couples’, ‘employed people’, ‘people with a lower equivalence income than Sfr. 2,000’, ‘people who have
no membership in associations’, ‘people living in non-urban areas’, and ‘German speaking canton’.
Data source: Leu et al. (1997).
estimator of variance, because random disturbances are potentially correlated
within groups or clusters. Here, dependence refers to residents of the same
canton.17
The estimation results show sizeable effects for both variables considered in
the basic hypothesis (they are shown at the top of Table 2). The overall effect of
participation rights (PR) on reported satisfaction with life is positive. In the
ordered probit estimation, a positive coefficient indicates that the probability of
stating well-being greater than any given level increases. The positive effect can
be attributed to a gain in outcome or procedural utility in cantons with more
extended participation rights. The interaction term ITPR in the second row reveals
the difference in positive effects for Swiss citizens and foreigners. The negative
coefficient indicates that foreigners benefit less from stronger participation rights
than the people in the reference group, i.e., the citizens. This result is consistent
with the hypothesis that foreigners gain less procedural utility from direct demo-
cratic participation rights than Swiss nationals. It has to be noted that the difference
in the average subjective well-being of foreigners and citizens is captured in a
separate control variable, which is not interpreted in terms of procedural utility.
If it is assumed that foreigners do not reap any procedural utility at all, but
cannot be excluded from the outcome of the political process, the relative size of
procedural utility can be assessed. Comparing the negative coefficient of the inter-
action variable, which captures procedural utility under these assumptions, with
the coefficient for the variable participation rights, suggests that two thirds of the
positive effect of more extended direct democratic participation rights are due to
procedural utility and one third stems from outcome utility.
An absolute interpretation of the size of the effects is provided by the marginal
effect. The marginal effect indicates the change in the proportion of persons
belonging to a stated satisfaction level when the independent variable increases
by one unit.18 In the case of dummy variables, the marginal effect is evaluated
with regard to the reference group. It must hold that if changes over all categories
are summed up they add up to zero. In order to measure the shift in the distribu-
tion, we therefore only show the marginal effects for the top class of complete
satisfaction with life (score 10) in Table 2. An increase in the index of participation
rights by one point raises the proportion of persons indicating very high satisfac-
tion with life by 3.3 percentage points. For foreigners, however, this effect is
smaller, as the interaction term ITPR has to be considered. 2.3 percentage points
of the increased probability of reporting maximum subjective well-being cannot be
reaped by the foreigners. Based on the assumptions made, this is because they are
excluded from the political process and thus from procedural utility.
beyond outcomes: measuring procedural utility 101
..........................................................................................................................................................................
17 Ignoring the clustering in the estimation model is likely to produce downward biased standard errors,
due to the effects of aggregate variables on individual data (Moulton, 1990). To get unbiased standard
errors for the aggregate variable ‘participation rights’, the 26 cantons are used as sample units.
18 Alternatively, the marginal effect indicates the change of probability belonging to a stated satisfaction
level when the independent variable increases by one unit.
The effect of procedural utility, as reflected in reported life satisfaction itself, is
sizeable. This can be seen when the total variation in participation rights is con-
sidered, i.e., when citizens in canton Basel Land (with the highest democracy index
of 5.69) are compared to citizens in canton Geneva (with the lowest direct parti-
cipation rights of 1.75). The former benefit from procedural utility, which increases
their probability of being completely satisfied by approximately 9.1 percentage
points ([5.69–1.75] 2.3 percentage points). This effect for procedural utility is
larger than the effect of being in the top income category (> Sfr. 5,000 per month)
rather than in the bottom income category (< Sfr. 2,000 per month), which is the
reference category in Table 2. The latter effect amounts to 6.5 percentage points.
The results discussed so far hold ceteris paribus, i.e., if a number of determinants
or correlates of happiness are controlled for. Most important are individual socio-
demographic characteristics. In the estimation equation, the respondent’s age,
gender, health status, educational level, civil status, employment status, and house-
hold income are considered. The results for these variables are discussed in Frey
and Stutzer (2000) and are similar in size and direction to those found in other
microeconomic happiness functions (see, e.g., Blanchflower and Oswald, 2004). In
addition, four variables are included that control for three potential alternative
explanations. Firstly, a dummy variable for people’s participation in clubs or asso-
ciations is used to test whether citizens in cantons with stronger participation rights
may have accumulated more Putnam (2000) style social capital and thus enjoy
higher subjective well-being than citizens in cantons with less extended democratic
rights. Secondly, a dummy variable for living in an urban area is included to
investigate the argument that direct democratic rights could be weaker in urban
areas where most of the foreigners live, and thus the raw effect may reflect urbani-
zation. Thirdly, dummies for the language that is spoken in the canton are included
in order to test whether the patterns in the descriptive statistics may capture
cultural differences within Switzerland instead of institutional variation.
However, as presented in Table 2, even controlling for these factors, participation
rights have a sizeable effect on individual procedural utility.
4.3 Robustness analysis: participation rights versus actual participation
Participation in democracy can be characterized by rights but it is also reflected
in actual participation. Actual participation is thus another aspect of participatory
political decision-making, which may provide procedural utility. The standard
calculus of voting based on expected utility maximization solely considers outcome
utility (see Mueller, 1989; Aldrich, 1997). It concludes that rational voters never
participate in political decisions, because the probability of affecting the outcome
is close to zero with most sizes of electorates, while there are participation costs.
However, this prediction is at odds with the empirical observations that citizens do
indeed cast their votes, even if their expected influence is virtually nil. This throws
doubt on the rational choice approach as traditionally formulated. Some authors
therefore have identified various procedural utilities which voters may derive from
102 b. s. frey and a. stutzer
political participation, for instance a utility from compliance with their sense of
civic duty or from the value of expressing an ideological view (Hardin, 1982;
Brennan and Buchanan, 1985; Jones and Hudson, 2000; Schuessler, 2000).
To check the reliability of the previous results, two robustness tests are per-
formed that include indicators of actual participation. The first indicator of
actual participation is voting participation in national ballots. National ballots
are considered in order to keep the content of the ballots equal for all the voters.
This does not mean that the expected outcome utility of the voting decision is
equally distributed across jurisdictions. Consequently, we again use a differences-
in-differences approach to conduct the empirical analysis. The participation rate
is measured at the cantonal level. Average actual participation is calculated for 45
national ballots on referenda and initiatives. These ballots were held between
February 19, 1992 and December 4, 1994, i.e., during the same years that the
personal interviews were conducted. An overview of the variation in actual
participation rates across cantons is presented in the Appendix.
Table 3 shows the results for two ordered probit estimations that include voting
participation. In panel A the average participation rate (PRATE) and the interac-
tion variable with citizen status (ITPRATE) are included without and in panel B
with the variable for participation rights. The variable for the actual participation
rate tests for a partial correlation between actual participation and reported satis-
faction with life. The statistically insignificant coefficients suggest that there is no
such relationship in the data set at hand. Whether this negligible correlation is
due to a net effect that equalizes a positive effect due to procedural utility, and a
negative effect caused by low outcome utility in cantons with high participation
rates, is tested with the interaction variable ITPRATE. ITPRATE identifies the
contribution of active participation on subjective well-being that is independent
of any outcome considerations. However, the coefficients of the interaction term
in panel A and B are also estimated very imprecisely and give no evidence of a
correlation between life satisfaction and actual participation.19 This result, however,
does not imply that the exercise of voting rights yields no utility. It might simply
be the case that there is heterogeneity across voters in their benefits from voting.
If they optimize and self-select as voters and non-voters, we need not expect to see
any difference in utilities across people with different likelihoods to vote. In con-
trast, if procedural utility from voting provides extra pleasure utility differentials
would be possible.20
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19 The estimation results for a sample excluding observations from canton Schaffhausen—the only
canton with compulsory voting—neither differ qualitatively nor quantitatively from the ones reported
in the text.
20 In order to make this claim testable, one would need a theory about the relation between the nature of
preferences and people’s well-being. A proper test would, moreover, require a strategy to identify
exogenous variation in actual participation. Laws on compulsory voting, as suggested by one referee,
are one possible instrument. However, in the Swiss context there is only one canton left, Schaffhausen,
applying such a rule. More variation would be needed for an empirical test.
While there is no procedural utility of actual participation reflected in reported
subjective well-being, the effect for participation rights seems robust. The overall
effect for democratic participation rights as well as the interaction effect that
captures procedural utility are of similar size as in Table 2 and are estimated
with a low standard error.
The second sensitivity test focuses on the use of participation instruments. It is
studied whether citizens get procedural utility from the democratic rights them-
selves or rather from their application in the political process.21 Direct democratic
decision-making at lower levels of the state is often seen as a social event serving
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21 With this second test, we also address the contrast between the existence of formal norms (rules-in-
form) and the application of norms (rules-in-use) (Sproule-Jones 1993). It is often argued that institu-
tional analysis should focus on rules-in-use to study policy outcomes. However, direct participation
rights reflect not only de jure institutions but capture de facto possibilities of the citizens to intervene
in the political process. The results in Table 3 indicate that the degree of formal participation rights is a
better indicator of citizens’ influence in the political process than the use of these rights.
Table 3 Procedural utility and actual participation.
Dependent variable: satisfaction with life
Weighted ordered probit
Std. err. adjusted to clustering on 26 cantons
..................................................................................................
A B C D
Participation rights (PR) 0.104 0.106
(3.57) (3.33)
PR x foreigner (ITPR) 0.090 0.080
(2.37) (2.00)
Actual participation rate/10 0.013 0.048
(PRATE) (0.16) (0.78)
PRATE x foreigner (ITPRATE) 0.030 0.086
(0.34) (1.16)
Use of participation instruments 0.002 0.004
(USEP) (0.79) (2.03)
USEP x foreigner (ITUSEP) 0.001 0.002
(0.31) (0.41)
Foreigner 0.144 0.367 0.261 0.033
(0.34) (1.08) (2.50) (1.02)
Demographic variables ————Yes————
Socio-economic variables ————Yes————
Contextual variables ————Yes————
Observations 6124 6124 6124 6124
Prob > F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0002 0.0002
Notes: Dependent variable: level of satisfaction on a ten point scale. White estimator for variance.
T-values in parentheses. Reference group: ‘Swiss’, ‘people younger than 30’, ‘men’, ‘healthy people’,
‘people with low education’, ‘couples’, ‘employed people’, ‘people with a lower equivalence income than
Sfr. 2,000’, ‘people who have no membership in associations’, ‘people living in non-urban areas’, and
‘German speaking canton’.
Data sources: Anne´e politique Suisse (1993–95), Leu et al. (1997) and Swiss Federal Statistical Office
(1993–95).
needs for social relatedness. This would be quite a different source of procedural
utility than discussed with regard to participation rights.
Panel C and D in Table 3 present two happiness equations that include indica-
tors for the use of political participation instruments (USEP). In order to discri-
minate between outcome utility and any sort of process utility interaction terms are
added (ITPR, ITUSEP). The use of democratic instruments is measured by the
number of ballots that have been conducted in the years between 1992 and 1994 in
Swiss cantons. An overview of the variation in the use of direct democratic instru-
ments is presented in the Appendix. The results in panel C give no indication for a
direct relation between the use of instruments of direct political participation and
the reported level of satisfaction with life and do not allow the identification of any
sort of procedural utility. The size of the coefficients is not trivial but they are
measured with very low statistical precision. Panel D provides a clearer picture.
It shows that the differentiated effects of participation rights on citizens’ and
foreigners’ subjective well-being is robust to the inclusion of a second indicator
of actual participation. Moreover, the actual use of participation rights seems
negatively correlated with reported satisfaction with life. As there is only a weak
differentiated effect for foreigners, this might indicate that the number of ballots
for a given level of participation possibilities captures the degree of antagonism
within a particular society.
Overall, it may be argued that actual participation, which affects people’s well-
being only during a restricted period of political activation, is less comprehensive
than political participation rights. This is reflected in the supportive evidence for
procedural utility from participation rights while there are no clear indications for
differentiated effects of actual participation on citizens’ and foreigners’ subjective
well-being.
4. Conclusions
The concept of procedural utility represents a different approach to human well-
being from the standard outcome-oriented approach in social science research.
Procedural utility refers to the utility that people gain from the decision-making
process itself, irrespective of the outcome.
In this paper, participatory decision-making in politics is considered a possible
source of procedural utility. People may have a preference for participation as an
activity as well as a characteristic of an institution.22 If so, the right to directly
participate in the democratic process gives citizens a sense that their preferences are
seriously taken into account in a fair political process. Foreigners who are excluded
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22 In our analysis, we discuss procedural utility for given preferences and are thus orthodox in this
dimension. Future research might consider that processes change values (i.e., preferences) and therewith
change utility indirectly. This has been argued in particular for the role of discussion in the democratic
process (Buchanan, 1954; and Frey, 1994).
from political decision-making cannot gain such procedural utility. The results of
our empirical analysis are consistent with this notion of procedural utility. Citizens,
as well as foreigners, living in jurisdictions with more developed political participa-
tion rights, enjoy higher levels of subjective well-being. The positive effect on
reported satisfaction with life is, however, smaller for foreigners, reflecting their
exclusion from procedural utility. It is thus empirically feasible to distinguish
between outcome and process utility. It is also possible to get a notion of the
relative size of outcome and process utility. The positive effect of participation
rights is three times as large for the citizens as it is for the foreigners, i.e., a
major part of the welfare gain from the favorable political process is due to pro-
cedural utility. Moreover, if the full range of participation rights is considered,
procedural utility accounts for larger differences in subjective well-being than the
full range of individual income.
Actual political participation is often rationalized by individuals’ experience of
procedural utility. Here it is argued that participation rights are more important in
terms of a feeling of control, self-determination or influence on the political sphere
than actual participation is. This hypothesis is not rejected, as we neither find
statistically significant nor sizeable positive effects of high participation rates and
frequent use of participation instruments on individual well-being.
Overall, ‘going beyond outcomes’ helps us to better understand what individuals
value. We submit that individuals value both outcomes and procedures and, in
particular, that they derive substantial utility from political participation rights.
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Appendix
Index for participation rights in Swiss cantons
Participation rights are measured here in terms of direct democratic participation
possibilities. In Switzerland, at the national level, these rights apply equally to all
citizens. However, these rights become very heterogeneous at the cantonal level.
An index is constructed to measure the different barriers preventing citizens from
entering the political process, apart from elections, in the year 1992. The index is
based mainly on data collected in Trechsel and Serdu¨lt (1999) (for details see
Stutzer, 1999).
The four main legal instruments directly influencing the political process in
Swiss cantons are (i) the popular initiative to change the canton’s constitution,
(ii) the popular initiative to change the canton’s law, (iii) the compulsory and
optional referendum to prevent new law or changing law and (iv) the compulsory
and optional referendum to prevent new state expenditure. Barriers are in terms of
(i) the necessary number of signatures needed to launch an instrument (absolute
and relative to the number of citizens with the right to vote), (ii) the legally allowed
time span to collect the signatures and (iii) the level of new expenditure per head
allowing a financial referendum. Compulsory referenda are treated like referenda
with the lowest possible barrier. Each of these restrictions is evaluated on a six point
scale: ‘one’ indicates a high barrier, ‘six’ a low one. From the resulting ratings, a
non-weighted average is calculated for the composite index, which represents
the measure of participation rights in Swiss cantons. The results are presented in
Table A.1.
Voting participation in national ballots across Swiss cantons
The average participation rate is measured at the cantonal level. Actual participa-
tion in 45 national ballots on referenda and initiatives is taken into consideration.
These ballots took place between February 19, 1992 and December 4, 1994. Table
A.1 gives an overview of participation rates. The high participation rate in canton
Schaffhausen is due to compulsory voting.
Use of democratic participation rights across Swiss cantons
The use of democratic participation instruments is measured by the total number
of initiatives and referenda that were held in each canton in the years 1992 to 1994.
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Table A.1 Indicators of political participation across Swiss Cantons
Democratic Voting participation Use of democratic
Canton participation rights in national ballots participation rights
Aargau 5.46 45.59 15
Appenzell i. Rh. 5.25 47.99 19
Appenzell a. Rh. 5.50 55.63 18
Bern 3.50 49.30 21
Basel Landschaft 5.69 51.70 18
Basel Stadt 4.40 51.20 22
Fribourg 2.42 42.22 6
Genve 1.75 44.03 23
Glarus 5.50 45.01 29
Graubu¨nden 4.75 40.21 20
Jura 3.71 41.67 4
Luzern 4.48 49.10 15
Neuchtel 2.13 41.49 4
Nidwalden 4.92 50.02 23
Obwalden 5.58 45.20 20
St. Gallen 3.40 49.11 6
Schaffhausen 5.08 70.78 22
Solothurn 5.42 55.97 32
Schwyz 4.93 45.93 11
Thurgau 4.04 49.48 8
Ticino 2.10 46.40 5
Uri 5.42 46.63 25
Vaud 2.42 40.17 5
Valais 3.42 45.56 14
Zug 4.42 54.80 6
Zu¨rich 4.17 51.80 37
Data sources: Anne´e Politique Suisse (1993–95) and Swiss Federal Statistical Office (1993–95).
